Project Independence: Formulation, Change, and Fragmentation by Levy, Susan G.
Journal of Political Science 
Volume 7 
Number 1 (Fall) Article 2 
November 1979 
Project Independence: Formulation, Change, and Fragmentation 
Susan G. Levy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Levy, Susan G. (1979) "Project Independence: Formulation, Change, and Fragmentation," Journal of 
Political Science: Vol. 7 : No. 1 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol7/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact commons@coastal.edu. 
Project Independence 
Formulation, Change, and Fragmentation 
SUSAN G. LEVY* 
University of California , Berkeley 
I. Introduction 
The question , then, is what choices does a high energy 
civilization have to continue its benefits and still protect 
the planet and people that live on it. 1 
In the realm of United States governmental complexities, policy innova-
tions are general ly the result of a crisis or need. 2 Within the institutions of 
government and the society as a whole , consensus relating to the existence of 
the crisis or need must be omnipresent to legitimize and effectuate policy. 
Government and society often recognize the acute or crisis situations which 
require emergency innovations. However, when long range planning be-
comes the criteria for policy execution , the need is transmuted into incremen-
talism. Herein lies the determinant in the failure of Project Independence as a 
response to the depletion of the nonrenewable resource - petroleum - and 
energy self-sufficiency in the United States. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the following objectives: (1) the 
formulation and change in the theoretical considerations of Proj ct Indepen-
dence; (2) the fragmentation of policy implementation within the United 
States as a result of major obstacles - the petroleum industry , national 
security priorities, environmentalists , and American consumers ; and finally , 
(3) the future prospects for self-sufficiency in the interdependent global 
system. 
In the analysis and assessment of petroleum production , available re-
sources , and/ or consumption , the statistical data available was frequently 
inconsistent. For national security reasons, countries often enhance or reduce 
capability factors according to individual policy. Since a detailed analysis of 
* Formerly associated with the University of North Carolina , Charlotte Department of Political 
Science 
1 Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation , A Time to Choose, (Cambridg e: Ballinger 
Publishing Co. , 1974), p. 224. 
2 elson Polsby , "'Policy Initiation in the American Political System ." Perspectives 011 the 
Presidency, ed. Aaron Wildavsky , (Boston: Little , Brown and Company , 1975), p. 226. 
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the oil indu stry is not propos ed in this study, only two policy positions are 
discussed - th e Oil Depletion Allowance and the Oil Import Quota. Tabl es 1, 
2, and 3 pr ese nt a United Stat es profile in petrol eum supply, demand , 
imports , exports , and reserves. 
II . Project Ind ependence - Formulation and Chang e 
After th e outbreak of Arab-Isra eli hostilities in Octob er, 1973, the United 
States faced an unpr ecedent ed energy shortage as the result of th e political 
use of oil by th e OAPEC 3 nations. In respons e, former Presid ent Richard M. 
ixon announced formally that the need for energy self-sufficiency was critical 
for America's ind epend ence . Moreove r , ixon asserted that the national goal 
of energy independ ence would be accomplish ed by 1980 through "Proj ec t 
Ind epend ence. "4 Th e United Stat es, ther eafter , would mee t its energy ne eds 
from America 's own energy resources. 
The crisi situation provid ed the stimulus for policy innovation . Howeve r, 
by its very natur e, Proj ec t Ind epend ence was a long rang e goal, and in-
creme ntalism set in before a comprehensive policy could develop. 
Prior to the 1970's th e United Stat es had be en concerned about petroleum 
and a national energy policy in a somewhat "de facto sense. "5 The recognition 
of a need to deve lop a comprehensive national energy policy was nonexistent. 
Moreover , regulations and / or laws which did exist were beneficial primarily 
to the oil indu sh·y. 
Following th e oil crisis and Nixon's Project Indep end ence speech , the 
impetus for an energy policy emerged. 6 Initially , Congress passed th e 
Emergency Petrol eum Act of 1973 allocating specific temporary presidential 
authority to deal with shortages of crude oil. Th e purpos e of the Act was to 
minimize th e adverse effects of such shortages on th e American people and 
the domes tic economy. 7 
In Januar y 1974, ixon delivered a legislativ e message to Congr ess specifi-
cally addressing tJ1e energy crisis. ixon propos ed th e establishm ent of the 
3 OAP EC nations (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Cou ntri es) includ e Abu Dhabi , 
Algeria, Bahrain , Kuwait, Egypt , Libyan Arab Republi c, Qatar , Saudi Arabia , Syrian Arab 
Republic and Ir aq; not to be confuse d with OPEC (Organization of Petro leum Exporting Cou n-
tries) which inclu des Venezuela , Saudi Arabia , Kuwait , Iran , Iraq ; subsequen t expan sion in-
cluded Indonesia , Libya, Qatar , Abu Dh abi, Algeria, igeria, Ecuador and Gabon (associate 
member). The OAPEC nations institut ed the Arab Oil Embargo which resu lted in susp ens ion of 
oil expor ts to the United States and The etherland s. For a discussion of international oil and the 
. S. role, see Robert B. Krueger, The United States and lnt emati ona l Oil, ( ew York: Praeger 
Publishers , 1975), Part I , 11. 
• The New York Times, ovembe r 8, 1973, p . 32. 
5 Robert B. Krueger, The Unit ed States andl11ter11ational Oil , (New York: Praege r Publi shers, 
1975), p. 83. 
6 Ibid . 
7 U. S. Congress, Public Law 93-159. ove mber 27, 1973. Th e 55 m.p.h. spee d limit 
recommenda tion was a dir ec t result of this policy. Howeve r, in our system of government , 
Pnforcem nt remained at the stat e leve l. ot all states enforced the recommendati on. 
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TABLE 1. United States Petroleum Supply and Demand 
(Thousands of Barrels) 
1974 1975 Per Cent 
Daily 
Total Auerage 
Total Stocks, Jan . 1 . . . . . . 1,008,307 
New Supply : 
Dom estic Crude Prod . 
Dom . Lease Cond. Prod. 
Domestic NGL Prod. . . 
Other hydrocarbons .... 
Total U.S. Production* . 
Crude Oil Imports .... . 
Product Imp orts . ... .. . 
Total Imports ...... . . . 
Total New Supply ...... . 
Domestic Demand : 
Motor Gasoline ....... . 
Aviation Gasoline ..... . 
Jet Fuel-Naph. type .. 
Jet Fu el-Kero . type 
Kerosene ............ . 
Distillate Fuel Oil .... . 
Residual Fuel Oil ..... . 
Others ..... ... ... .. . 
Total Domestic Demand .. 
Exports : 
Crude Oil 
Products ............. . 
Total Exports .......... . 
3,056,094 
143,234 
616,098 
13,057 
3,828,483 
1,269,155 
953,024 
2,222,179 
6,050,662 
2,386,177 
16,215 
81,171 
281,429 
64,352 
1,072,812 
957,811 
1,209,504 
6,069,471 
1,074 
79,417 
80,491 
8,373 
392 
1,688 
36 
10,489 
---
3,477 
2,611 
---
6,088 
16,577 
---
6,538 
44 
223 
771 
176 
2,939 
2,624 
3,314 
16,629 
3 
217 
---
220 
Total Demand ........... 6,149,962 16,849 
Unaccounted for Crud e . . . - 5,827 
Crude Oil Losses . . . . . . . . 4,789 
Net Processing Gain . . . . . . 175,255 
Total Change in Stocks . . . +65,339 
Total Stocks , Dec. 31 . 1,073,646 
• New basis. 
- 16 
---
13 
480 
+179 
Daily Change 
Total Auerage 1974/1975 
1,121,116* 
2,920,000 
133,900 
594,500 
12,600 
3,661,000 
8,000 
367 
1,629 
34 
---
10,030 
---
1,489 ,900 4,082 
695,700 1,906 
2,185,600 5,988 
5,846,600 16,018 
2,436,200 
14,400 
77,400 
290,500 
60,000 
1,043,300 
888,600 
1,130,600 
5,941,000 
2, 100 
71,500 
73,600 
6,674 
40 
212 
796 
164 
2,858 
2,435 
3,098 
---
6 
196 
202 
6,014,600 16,479 
+13,400 
4,916 
160,000 
+ 484 
1,121,600 
+ 37 
13 
438 
+ 1 
4.5 
- 6.4 
3.5 
5.6 
4.4 
+ 17.4 
27.0 
- 1.6 
- 3.4 
+ 2.1 
9.1 
4.9 
+ 3.2 
6.8 
2.8 
7.2 
6.5 
- 2.1 
+100.0 
- 9.7 
- 8.2 
- 2.2 
- 8.8 
SOURCE : 1974, Bureau of Mines; data for 1975 estimat ed on basis of Bureau of Mines data for first eight 
months and subsequent wee kly repor ts compiled by the AP!. 
NOTE : Percentage changes are calculated on a daily average basis. 
NOTE : The Oil and Gas j ournal (1976) reports U. S. crud e production at 8,765,000 for 1974, 8,35 1,000 for 
1975, and a -4. 7% change for the 1974-1975 period. 
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TABLE 2. Crude Petroleum: Changing Structure of Production and Ex-
ports, 1955-1973 
1955 1960 1970 
Production 
World 
(millions of tons) .. .. 767 1,045 2,275 
Percentage 
contribut ed by 
Unit ed States 43.8 33.3 20.9 
Exports 
World 
(millions of tons) . ... 254 382 1,165 
Percentage 
contribut ed by 
United States .. .... 0.6 0 .1 0.1 
SOURCE: United ations World Economic Survey, 1973. 
* 1973 figures are for the fir st nine month s. 
TABLE 3. United States Crude Resources 
A. Estimat ed Proven Oil Resources 
Oil & Gas 
Journal 
1/1/74 
bmt * bbo * 
Unit ed 
States ........ . 4.7 34.7 
1971 
2,402 
19.4 
1,267 
1972 
2,533 
18.4 
1,380 
World Oil 
1/1/74 
bmt 
4.8 
B. Est imated Recoverable, Undiscovered Crude Oil Potential 
1973* 
2,007 
16.9 
1,062 
bbo 
35.3 
Grand 
Offshor e Onshor e 
bmt bbo bmt bbo 
United 
States .... 4.1 30 7.5 55 
* Billion me tr ic tons, billion barr els of oil, 7.33 barre ls = 1 metric ton . 
SOURCE: World Oil (Sept ember, 1975) 
Total 
bmt bbo 
11.6 85 
OTE: Es timated pro ven rese rves are quantiti es recove rable in the futur e und er existing 
econo mic and operatin g conditi ons. 
Undi scovered potenti al includ es resources yet to be discovered in explored and un-
explored areas und er curr ent and futur e economic and technological conditi ons. 
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Federal Energy Administration (FEA ) to coordinate and expand programs 
dealing with the current energy emergency. 8 In addition, the esse ntial goals 
of Project Independence were outlined emphasizing first , a rapid incr ease of 
energy supplies thereby maximizing the production of oil, gas, coal and shale 
reserves and accelerating the use of nuclear power ; second , conservation by 
eliminating nonessential energy use and improving the efficiency of energy 
utilization ; and third , development of new technologies through energy re-
search and development programs. 9 ixon also recommended a relaxation in 
air quality standards to meet the goals of Project Ind epend ence. 10 
Nixon's energy message proposed essential indep endenc e from foreign 
suppliers by 1980. Notwithstanding the drastic schedule which generated a 
degree of skepticism, the public was officially notified that in a finite world , 
petroleum - a nonrenewable resource - was being consumed too rapidly. 
The posibility of a world without oil before the end of the century was a reality 
to be comprehended. 11 
The rigidity and single-minded approach of Project Independence led to 
conflicts and contradictions where the rapidity of changing circumstances 
confronted basic policy objectives in other areas. Two examples were evident 
where first the goal of an adequate supply had to be obtained at a reasonable 
price and second, where the objective of sufficient supply at a fair price had to 
be balanced against environmental considerations .12 
One month after Nixon's message to Congress, the Washington En ergy 
Conference convened to examine the international energy situation , to 
evaluate the implications , and to determine the viable alternatives open to 
meet the energy crisis. 13 Henry A. Kissinger , representing the United States , 
stated the American position in the global system as one of inter dependence. 
He introduced the term "Project Interd ependence " which later became 
former Presid ent Gerald R. Ford 's policy foundation. Kissinger emphasized 
that Project Independence was only an intermediate goal, with Project Inter-
dependence as an overall long range goal for the survival of the world 
economic system. 14 
8 U. S. Congressional Record, Vol. 120, o. 3, January 23, 1974, H . 153. 
9 l bid . 
10 Ibid ., H. 155. 
11 Jahangir Amuzegar , "The Oil Story : Facts , Fiction and Fair Play ," Foreign Affairs , 51, No. 
4, Ouly 1973), p. 678. 
12 Robert B. Krueger, op. cit. , p. 100-101. 
13 Communique of the Washington Energy Conferenc e, February 13, 1974, Atlanti c Com-
munity Quart erly , 12, o. 1, (Spring 1974), p. 117. The countries represen ted at this confere nce 
included : Belgium , Canada , Denmark , France , the Federal Republic of Germany , Ireland , Ital y, 
Japan , Luxembourg , The Netherlands , Norway , the United Kingdom and th e United States. Also 
participating in the conference was the Secretary General of the OECD (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Deve lopm ent) which included , in addition to the above coun tries, 
Australia , Austria , Finland , Gr eece , Iceland , Portugal , Spain , Sweden , Switzerland , and Turkey . 
14 Henry A. Kissinger, "The Washington Energy Conference , The American Challenge ," 
Atlantic Community Quarterly , 12, No. 1, (Spring 1974), p . 23. 
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As the flow of oil from th e OAPEC countri es resum ed, the crisis situation 
within the United States appeared to ease. How eve r, in May Congress pass ed 
the Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974 establishing th e Federal 
Energy Administration (FEA) to reorganize and consolidate government 
functions. 15 The purpos e of the FEA was to handle expeditiousl y energy 
problems and resou rces and to report to the Pr esident and Congress a com-
prehensive plan to alleviate the energy shortages. 16 
With ixon's resignation in August 1974 came a change in administration 
and a h·ansition in policy. At the World En ergy Confer ence , convened in 
September , 1974, former Pr esident Ford discuss ed the concept of Proj ect 
Ind epen dence in terms of Project Int erd ependenc e which he depicted as a 
compre hensive world energy program where American resources would ben-
efit all mankind. 17 
By ovem ber , 1974, the first Proj ec t Ind epend ence report was delivered to 
Congress by Dr. John Sawhill. Dr . Sawhill explained that prior to 1950, the 
United States was an oil-surplus nation - totally self-sufficient. 18 However , 
imports of crud e oil and petrol eum products accounted for 15 per cent of total 
domestic consumption , and by 1973 import s had increas ed to 35 per cent .19 
Morever, oil account ed for 46 per cent of United Stat es dom estic energy 
consump tion. 20 Th e foundation of Proj ec t Ind epend ence was th e maint e-
nance of an assured supply of energy both in tim e of war as well as in time of 
peace. 21 Having assessed such risks as high dom estic energy pri ces, inflation , 
supp ly interruptions , a pot ential drop in the real gross national produ ct, 
environme ntal deterioration , and depletion of dom estic rese rves, Dr. Sawhill 
maintained that the United Stat es could be independ ent rath er than totally 
self-sufflcient . 22 Adeq uat e and secure supplies, togeth er with a significant 
reduction of imports , would provid e the necess ary degre e of ind epend ence, 
assum ing of course that the sources of oil imports would not resort to political 
manipulation of the vital commodity. 
In his State of th e Union Message on Januar y 15, 1975, former Pr esident 
Ford exten ded the energy indepe nd ence deadlin e to 1985. AddHionally, Ford 
proposed a restoration of surplus in total energy. 23 Following Ford 's dir ec-
tion, the Congress passed th e En ergy Policy and Conservation Act on D e-
cember 22, 1975. Th e esse ntial thru st of th e Act was th e creation of a strategic 
65. 
15 U. S. Cong ress, Public Law 93-275, May 7, 1974. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Robert B. Krueger , op. cit. , p. 88. 
18 U. S. Congress , Serial No. 93-54, Project Ind ependence Repo rt , November 21, 1974, p. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ib id. 
21 Robert 8. Krueger , op. cit. , p. 88. 
22 U. S. Congress, Serial No. 93-54, op. cit. , p. 67. 
23 The New York Times, January 16, 1976, p. 24. President Ford also requested a relaxation of 
clean air standards to increase the use of coal. 
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pe troleum reserve capable of redu cing the impa ct of seve re energy supply 
int erruptions . 24 . The restoration of surplus (stockpiling) and th e creation of 
the sh·ategic petroleum rese rve must be equated with an increas e in imports 
which , in fact , was to take place. (See Table 1, Crude Imports .) This shift of the 
Ford Administration was not a total retr ea t from the policy objectives of 
Project Ind epend ence, but rath er an assumption that the crisis had ease d and 
that long range policy goals might then emphasiz e self-sufficiency rath er than 
compl ete independence. 
III . The Petroleum Industry 
Because petrol eum is a vital resourc e which affects all aspects oflife for the 
individual as well as the nation , the simplistic respons e of Nixon's Proj ect 
Ind epend ence as a cure-all encount ered major obstacles. Among the obstacles 
was th e petrol eum industry. 
Th e oil companies do not , per se , repr ese nt a monopolistic power over th e 
petrol eum mark et. 25 Howev er, the industry poss esses an inordinat e amount 
of political power , significantly vast to shape its own economic system and 
goals not necessar ily similar to or identical with the public interest. 26 Where 
th e economic and political power of the oil industry is mutually existent , the 
"legislative and administrative environment" may be strategically manipu-
lated. 27 Th e American system of government is characterized by a fragmented 
policy proc ess of multipl e subsystems linking segments of the bur eaucracy 
with congressional committees and int erest groups. Th e key to policy making 
power is access to these subsystems. 28 
The United States oil industry is enormous. For exampl e, it is thr ee tim es 
larg er than th e iron and steel industri es , twice as large as th e automotive 
industi y in assets. 29 The employm ent capabilities are imm ense where large 
segments of the population are dir ectly affected by the maintenanc e of jobs 
and financial security. 30 
Within the industry power structure, associations exist which exercise 
power at multipl e leve ls of government. Th e oil lobby extends its influenc e 
from the local leve l of government, through state and federal governments 
24 U. S. Congr ess, Public Law 94-163, December 22, 1975. 
25 Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation , op. cit. , p. 230. The major oil compan ies 
include: Gulf Oil Compa ny, Exxon, Standard Oil of California , Texaco , Mobil Oil Compa ny, 
Briti sh Petro leum , and Royal Dut ch Shell (the parent company of Shell Oil Compa ny). These 
companies are the seve n larges t oil compa nies in the world and control most of the free world's oil. 
For this study, only the American compan ies (all of the above majors excep t Briti sh Petroleu m 
and including Shell Oil Company ), the small compan ies as well , are cons idered. 
26 Ibid . 
27 I bid ., p . 238. 
28 Ibid ., p. 239'. 
29 Ibid ., p. 240. 
30 Ibid . 
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and 011 through foreign governments. 31 Th e elusive operations of th e oil lobby 
have resulted in the disproportionate repres entation of congressmen from 
energy- producing states securing chairmanship positions on influential com-
mittees. 32 
The American Petroleum Institute (API) is comprised of repr ese ntativ es 
from the total indusby although dominat ed by the majors. The API conducts 
research and reports dir ec tly to Congress. 33 The ational Petroleum Council 
( PC) functions as an oil-advisory group for the Secretary of the Int erior. Th e 
NPC , composed of industry representatives , is appointed dir ectly by the 
Secretary. 34 
The federal government has adopted a laissez faire policy in its relations 
with the oil industry. Where th e maintenance of the private enterprise system 
has existed , two specific regulatory procedures have proven beneficial to the 
industry. 35 Special tax relief has been provided for the industry in the form of 
an Oil Dep le tion Allowance. The Allowance grants dir ectly to the petrol eum 
compan ies a 22 per cent income tax deduction based on the gross value of oil 
produced. 36 Th e Allowance applies up to 50 per cent of net income and is a 
highly controversial policy. The indusb·y maintains that the Depletion Allow-
ance insures growth of the industry. Opponents of the indusb·y argue that the 
Allowance represents a tax discrimination and withholds important financial 
resources from the government. 37 
Until 1973, th e preferential b·eatment of the oil industry had been demon-
strated through the use of the Oil Import Quota. Through application of the 
Quota on the amount of crude oil entering the country , the government 
supported and assured the domestic companies a major portion of the growing 
31 Ibid ., p. 241. A study by Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wisco nsin) demonstrated that as a major 
contributor to political campa igns , the oil industry contributed $4,981,840 to former President 
Nixon's 1972 re-election campaign. Gulf , Phillips , and Ashland admitted to illegally donating a 
total of $300,000 in corporate funds to the President's campaign. 
32 I bid. , p. 251. 
33 Ibid., p. 241. 
38 Ibid. 
35 Over th e years, other policy measures have included the Connally Act of 1935, otherwise 
known as the "Hot Oil' ' Act - the federal governme nt had the authority to restrict or prevent 
movement in interstate comme rce of "oil produced in violation of state law;" th e Int erstate 
Commerce Commission has the power to regulate both service and rates of interstate pipelines ; 
and flnally , the federal government , as th e owner of oil-bearing lands both on and off shore , has 
the power to regulate the produ ction by whatever means it des ires. Jn practice , however , 
producers who opera te on public domain are subject to the enforcemen t procedures within the 
state where the land s are located . Resources for th e Future StalTReport , U. S. Energy Policies: An 
Agenda for Researc h , (Baltimor e: Th e Johns Hopkin s Press , 1963), p. 40. See also , David Howard 
Davis , Energy Politics , (New York: St. Martin 's Press , 1974), p. 42-86. 
36 Resources for th e Future Staff Report , U. S. Energy Policies: An Agenda for Research , 
(Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins Press , 1963), p. 40. For 43 years, th e Allowance remained at 27 
per cent. 
37 Ibid., p . 41. 
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TABLE 4. United States Total Gross Consumption of Petroleum Resources 
by Major Sources and Consuming Sectors 
(In Trillion s of Btu's Per Year) 
Business-As-Us ual - Petroleum at $11 Per Barrel 
Year Consttmi.ng Sector 
1972 .. Househo ld/Commercial 
Industrial ......... ....... . 
Transportation ............ . 
Elect'rl. Genera tion ....... . 
Synt he tics ................ . 
TOTAL ........ ........ . 
1977 .. Household / Commercial .. . . . 
Industrial ....... .... ..... . 
Transportation ........... . . 
E lect' rl. Genera tion ....... . 
Synthetics .......... . ... . . . 
TOTAL ................ . 
1980 .. Househo ld/ Commercial . ... . 
Industria l ........ . ..... . . . 
Transportation ............ . 
Elect'r l. Generation .. ... .. . 
Synth etics ................ . 
TOTAL ... .. ... . ... ... . . 
1985 .. House hold/Commercia l ... . . 
Industrial .............. . . . 
Transportation ............ . 
Elect' rl. Generation . ...... . 
Synthet ics ................ . 
TOTAL . . .............. . 
Without 
Conservati .on 
6,667 
5,668 
17,264 
3,134 
233 
32,966 
5,825 
7,001 
17,863 
3,432 
34,121 
5,749 
7,567 
18,435 
3,166 
34,916 
5,914 
8,543 
20,565 
2,954 
37,976 
SO RCE : U. S. Congress , Serial o. 93-54, Proj ect Ind ependence Report 
W ith 
Conservation 
6,667 
5,668 
17,264 
3,134 
233 
32,966 
5,467 
6,866 
16,797 
3,251 
32,381 
5,370 
7,359 
17, 115 
2,640 
32,485 
5,380 
8,055 
17,720 
2,352 
33,507 
NOTE: Btu (British Thermal Unit) is the amount of energy needed to raise the tempera tur e of 
one pound of water by one Fahr enheit degree. 5.8 million Btu 's = one 42-gallon barr e l of 
oil. 
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market. 38 In 1959, President Eisenhower established mandatory oil import 
controls limiting the amount of foreign oil permitted to r.efiners and later to 
petrochemical producers. 39 In principle and practice , the federal government 
prevented large quantities of cheap foreign oil from entering the United 
States, thereby permitting the major companies to exploit the national re-
sources available. In effect, higher domestic outputs were encouraged as 
consumption increased ; price competitfon was restricted by foreign oil import 
quotas. 40 The import quotas existed until April 1973, when former President 
Nixon ordered abolition of the restrictions. 41 
The policy innovations of Project Independence never took into account the 
question of government intervention in the national and international ac-
tiviti es of the petroleum companies. The oil industry has , at times , propelled 
its own interests above those of the nation. Having maintained critical posi-
tions of influence as advisors to the Secretary of the Interior and to con-
gressmen, the industry became intricately involved in government actions 
and inactions on energy policy. 
IV. National Security Priorities 
The genesis of Project Independence was the maintenance of national 
security. 42 The evolution of national security in current terms has come to 
include economic and social well-being as well as military requirements. In 
other words, adequate and secure supplies of oil are inseparable from national 
security priorities. 43 
Functioning as an oil-deficient country, the United States had not depleted 
its energy supplies in the early 1970's. Rather , by a complex series of policy 
miscalculations and inactions , the United States had embarked on a course of 
increased foreign dependency. 44 
With the acknowledgment that our finite world could not continue rapid 
consumption of its nonrenewable resources , a policy of complete self-
sufficiency contradicted long range national security policies. On the one 
hand, total self-sufficiency would require an enormous share of national 
resources; howeve r, total dep endence on foreign oil, although economically 
38 £bid. From post World War lI until the Oil Embargo, consumption of oil increased rapidly. 
The increased use of the automobile, the growth of suburbia, the convenience and availability of 
oil - all contribu ted to the rise in consumption. 
39 Joseph S. Szyliowicz and Bard E. O'Neill , ed. , The Energy Crisis and U. S. Foreign Policy, 
(New York: Praeger Publishers , 1975), p. 56. 
40 £bid. 
41 [bid., p. 57. Prior to the 1972 elect ion , ixon ordered a Cabinet Task Force investigat ion 
into the oil import res triction problem. Oil lobby influences were politically successful in aiding 
the incumbent President. Therefore , ixon initially rejected the removal of import quotas. By 
April 1973, the election was over and the potential energy shortage was ev ident. 
42 Robert B. Kruege r , op. cit. , p. 91. 
43 lbi.d. 
44 Joseph S. Szyliowicz and Bard E. o· ei ll, op. cit., p. 39. 
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advantageous, would incr ease United States vulnerability in national securi-
ty. 45 
As depict ed in Dr. John Sawhill's report on Proj ect Indep end ence , it was 
questionable whether self-sufl"iciency wou ld solve energy-security problems 
in the very near futur e. A policy of self-sufl"iciency would regard the prese nt 
without planning for future needs. The exploitation of oil fields for current 
consumption would leave the future unprot ected. ationa l security priorities 
have bee n plagu ed by the indecisive course of action. A balanc e betwee n 
self-sufficiency and pr ese rvation of fotur e needs should be consid ered esse n-
tial for success ful policy impl ementation. 
V. Environmental Concerns 
Energy independ ence and sh·ingent conservation are concomitant as en-
visioned by the Projec t Ind epend ence Report. (See Tabl e 4. ) Moreove r, 
energy independ ence req uires a shift from our basic oil economy to other 
sources of energy which, by their very natur e, will incr ease the hazards of 
environm ental quality . Th e collision of environm ental goals and energy needs 
are no more evident than in Proj ec t Ind ep ndence . 
The Energy Supply and Environm ental Coordination Act of 1974 was 
int end ed to provid e for a means whereby an adequate supply of fuels would be 
obtained without j eopardizing th e environm ent. 46 How eve r, the coordination 
effect modified th e prioriti es set for environm ental quality . Th e Act extend ed 
motor vehicle emission standards two years by amending the Clean Air Act. 47 
In his 1975 Stat e of the Union Message, Pr esident Ford request ed additional 
modifications specifically compromising air quality goals for the use of coal. 48 
Wh ere coal has been in abundant supply, United Stat es policymak ers have 
compromised air quality standards for energy needs by permitting an increase 
in the amount of sulphur emitted into the air. 49 
In the end eavor to increas e energy sources, environm ental quality has bee n 
jeopardized forther by oil pollution resulting from offshore oil spills. Such 
pollution has had a devastating effect on salt marsh es which a.re the most 
biologically productive environm ents on earth. so 
Th e fragmentation of polici es has complicat ed the coordination of energy 
45 Robert H . Connery and Robert S. Gilmour , ed ., Th e National Energy Prob lem, (New York : 
Th e Academy of Political Science , 31, No . 2, December 1973), p. 135- 136. 
46 U. S. Congr ess , Publi c Law 93-319 , Jun e 22, 1974. 
47 Ibid . For requirements under the Clean Air Act, see 84 Stat. 168C. Emission stand ards 
were se t for 1975. P . L. 93-319 extends these standards to 1977. 
48 The New York Times , January 16, 1975, p. 24. 
49 Robert II. Conne1y and Rober t S. Gilmour , op . cit. , p. 39. "Air quality is generally a 
function of pollutant emissions , the assimi lative capacity of the environm ent , the control 
strateg ies in eITect and ambient-background leve ls. The dynamic interplay of these parameters is 
the basis for an intermittent control strat egy. " p. 179. 
50 Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation , op. cit ., p. 187. The Alaska pipeline , once an 
env ironme ntal conce rn , was passed by Congress when the shor tage of oil became evident . 
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and the envirnnm ent. 51 Stat e governments are th e regulators of policy con-
trol , and coordination has bee n ineffec tive on that level. Mor eover, a basic 
perception of the interr elationship of nonr enewabl e energy resourc es and th e 
environm ent has been lacking at all leve ls of the decision-making proc ess. 52 
For example, energy dev elopment has bee n attempted in the Rocky Moun-
tain area; howeve r, opposition from state governments and environm entalists 
have forestalled pursuits. The Energy Resea rch and D eve lopm ent Adminis-
tration (ERDA ) has been allocat ed sufficient dollars for th e deve lopm ent of 
synthe tic fuel although Congress has not investigat ed the impact on the 
enviro nment. 53 Wh ere the area rece ives less than 10 inch es of pr ecipitation a 
year, stat e governments and environmentalists have doubt ed that sufficient 
quantities of water exist in the region to support synthetic fuel proj ects 
without endang ering the environm ent. 54 The environm ental movem ent has 
become an obstacle to Proj ect Ind epend ence in that its goals for the pr ese rva-
tion of environm ental quality and conservation of resourc es has outweighed 
the govern ment's prioriti es . 
VI. The Ameri.can Consumer 
Where American life-styles have be en predicat ed on the beli ef that infinit e 
resources will always be availab le, consumers face a crisis brought about by 
the scarcity of energy resources. The ability of Americans to recognize and 
compre hend that its resourc es are limit ed is the foundation for th e futur e. 55 
Only then may th e nation dev elop th e abi lity to deal with and plan for realistic 
goals. 
The low cost of energy prior to th e embargo precipitat ed changes in 
lifestyles for all consumers. Att empt ed constraints on the availability of energy 
would perm ea te all Americans ' life-styles , requiring adjustm ents necess itated 
by inflation and th e critical need for conservation which is rese nted and 
fraught with political pitfalls amid conflicts ofinterest. 56 It has bee n report ed 
that the average American hous ehold consumes a total in excess of340 Btu 's of 
energy each year. 57 Six per cent of the average American 's incom e was 
allocated for gas (natural ), electricity and gasoline. 58 Moreove r , a correlation 
existed betwe en income and energy consumption the high er the hous ehold 
income , th e high er th e consumption of energy . 59 
51 Robert J-1. Conne ry and Rober t S. Gilmour , op . cit. , p. 184. 
52 Ibid ., p. 191-192. 
53 U. S. News & World Report, Dece mber 22, 1975, p. 43-44. 
54 I bid. 
55 Robert H . Connery and Robe rt S. Gilmour , op . cit., p. 24. 
06 Ibid., p. 37. 
07 Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation , op. cit. , p . 115. A Btu (Briti sh Therma l Uni t) 
is the amoun t of energy needed to raise the tempe ratur e of one pound of water by one Fahrenheit 
degree. 5.8 million Btu's = l 42-gallon barrel of oil. 
58 Ibid. This figure may be higher now. 
59 Ibid ., p. 128. 
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Consumers are advocates of energy conservation "so long as they do not 
have to change their life-styles , give up their oversized car , or pay more for a 
well-insulated house. "60 Long range conservation goals require the support of 
a large constituency. Without such support, implementation cannot be effec-
tuated. 61 
VII. Conclusion 
In an era of national and global interdependence , the parameters of United 
States energy policy must reflect the realities of world management for 
nonrenewable resources. Project Independence negated this view and was 
subsequently transformed into Project Interdependence. Nationally, the con-
flicts between the political process , consensus and environmental quality have 
resulted in the breakdown of effective policy implementation . Challenges of 
security, power , and economic stability will inevitably confront the United 
States in the future. To meet such challenges, a reorganization of dysfunc-
tional policies must encompass realistic goals. 
At present, the United States consumes approximately 17,222,400 barrels 
of oil per day. 62 Although discrepancies exist in the quantity of crude oil 
imported , the United States has increased its imports from approximately 6.4 
million barrels per day in 1973 to 7 million barrels per day estimated for 
1976. 63 In addition, the United States has increased its dependence on 
Middle East and orth African oil. 64 Within a few years, 50 per cent of United 
States imports will be from these two areas. 65 
If self-sufficiency is not the desired course, United States policy must 
examine other alternatives. A coordinated policy effort for the benefit of the 
nation as a whole appears essential. Policy must consider not only the oil 
industry , but also national security , the environment, and consumers. The 
reduction and leveling off of energy growth would require a concerted effort 
over a long period of time, but success could be attained without a devastating 
impact on the economy. 66 Although energy prices would be higher , the 
money , instead of being channeled for oil corporation profits , could be used to 
initiate or project growth in areas of public service. 67 In addition, a shift to 
alternative sources of energy would require serious consideration. As renew-
60 Robert H. Connery and Rob er t S. Gilmour , op. cit. , p. 53. 
61 Robert B. Kru eger, op. cit., p. 104. 
62 U. S. Depa rtment oflnterior , Bur eau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook , 1973, p. 924. See also, 
Tabl e 1 and U. S. News & World Report, April 5, 1976, p. 36-37. 
63 U. S. News & World Report, April 5, 1976, p. 36-37, as quoted from the . S. Bureau of 
Mines and American Petroleum Institut e. See also, Tabl e 1. The Oil and Gasjoumal , (February 
16, 1976), p . 28, reported U. S. production atB,351 ,000 b/d . With consumption at approximately 
17,222,400 b/d , imports may range between 7,500,000 b/d and 8,800,000 b/d . 
64 The Oil and Gas Journal , (January 5, 1976), p. 54. 
65 Ibid . 
66 Energy Policy Proj ect of the Ford Foundation , op. cit. , p. 111. 
67 Ibid. 
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able resources , solar and organi c energy could becom e major contributors as 
energy for the next ce ntur y. 68 
The pr ese rvation of th e environm ent int err elated with energy requir e-
ment s demands a reord ering of the commitm ent on th e part of the American 
consumer and th e federal governm ent. Th e quality of futur e life, or possibl y 
the existence of life itself, extends from policy measur es institut ed now. 
ss Ibid . 
